(By Joe Koletar and Jack Bigelow) (See previous posting for background information) In Post 1 of this series, we noted that one factor involved in the FBI’s decision to reduce its investigative activity into mortgage fraud is that “The FBI does not act on its own….Other entities and institutions [must concur in its priorities]”. The purpose of this post is to explore the reasons for why this reality plays a role in the downgrading of mortgage fraud investigations.
We get the first hint at why the FBI has downgraded its attention to mortgage fraud by viewing its web site’s mission statement:
The mission of the FBI is to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners.
Mortgage fraud appears to come across as a minor irritant when it is competing against “terrorist and foreign intelligence threats.”
The web site goes on to describe the various areas of FBI investigations (listed in this order):
• Terrorism
• Counterintelligence
• Cybercrime
• Public Corruption
• Civil Rights
• Organized Crime
• White Collar Crime (note that this is second from the bottom of the list)
• Violent Crimes and Major Thefts
Now, imagine that you are the FBI leadership and you are directly accountable to the citizens of the United States, represented by Members of Congress and, in the Executive Branch, the President of the United States and the reporting lines below that office. Every choice you make concerning what to investigate and what not to investigate is subject to questioning by those to whom you are accountable. You can be summoned before Congressional Hearings, you can either visibly support the administration in your decisions or you can bring shame to it. Your job, your career and your reputation are at stake. And beyond that—-The Bureau’s image and ability to secure funding for its operations are at risk also.
Given the stakes and given a very finite operating budget ($8.3 Billion), would you make the priority-setting in a vacuum of input, agreement, and consensus from the different areas of government affected by that priority-setting?
Our point is that the FBI’s action to reduce its focus on mortgage fraud is supported by other departments and agencies in the Federal Government—agencies with priorities that could conflict with the mortgage fraud issues.
A lot of those priorities changed on September 11, 2001.
The impact of 9/11 on the Federal Government’s priorities was immense. Clearly a terrorist attack, the impact was felt most profoundly among the nation’s law enforcement and counterterrorism structures. Americans were dramatically awakened from a somewhat smug sense of security by the signal that there are actually brilliant people out there who would kill themselves to kill us! A new and scary clarity emerged. Not only had our national security been compromised, it had been violated in a tragic and public action fraught with outrageous dismissal of the values of what we believed to be civil existence in the international arena.
From the wreckages of The Pentagon, the World Trade Center, and the downed airliner in Pennsylvania arose a new determination and a redoubling of effort to investigate, prosecute, and prevent further acts of terrorism in the United States and in other nations too. The Federal Government, on behalf of its citizenry constituency, jumped into action.
Thus the second reason for relegating mortgage fraud to a lower priority:
The events of 9/11 changed everything. Not only our personal lives, but the priorities of the military and any number of law enforcement, intelligence, and other national securities agencies. Congress provided some budget assistance in reaction to this attack, but other programs were, of necessity, reevaluated and adjusted in the scale of post-attack priorities.
Guess what one of the “other programs” was: FBI investigations of reported incidences of mortgage fraud.
In this posting, we are not questioning the reevaluations and adjustments. We are duly noting that they occurred and are suggesting that this is likely to be a second factor in the reduction of investigatory focus on mortgage fraud. This is a case study in the political “ripple effect” of how a searing national event can have a substantial effect far and wide on government operations of all kinds. Including the investigation of mortgage frauds.