Fish Always Rots From the Head Down

Fish Always Rots from the Head Down (With Daven Morrison and Jack Bigelow) In recent months, the U.S. military has been beset by a proliferation of fraud scandals. At first glance, some of the offenses may not seem like “fraud”.

  • In the past seven years, the Navy uncovered at least five cases of cheating on exams and tests qualifying members for new or additional responsibilities (leading to more privileges and greater pay).
  • In January, 92 Air Force Nuclear Missile officers were implicated in alleged cheating in a key proficiency exam.

Other cases are more obviously fraudulent:

  • In the Army, a recruiting program for the National Guard involving bonuses for soldiers influencing friends to join up was found to have been rife with fraudulent, phony recruitments. An Army audit found that 1,200 recruiters received payments potentially fraudulent, according to USA Today. Another 2,000 recruiting assistants received “questionable” payments and more than 200 officers are still under investigation.

Many of these cases remain under investigation and hence, few details have been published. So all we can do at this point is to offer educated opinions as to what seems to be in play in these cases. We do so looking through the lens proposed in our book, The A.B.C.’s of Behavioral Forensics (Wiley, 2013). In the book, we point out that every incident of fraud results from the well-known fraud triangle—a time-tested explanatory model that posits, a la the fire triangle (oxygen, heat and fuel), that for a fraud to occur three elements must be present – means (access to funds,) perceived need (I need or deserve the money,”) and rationalization (It’s OK, because….)”

Here, the factor of Opportunity is quite obvious. Where there’s smoke there’s fire, and where egregious scandals pointing to a cheating culture have emerged, there must have been ample opportunity. We can be sure that investigators are attempting to determine why the controls over these opportunities were either absent or ineffective. As Senator Claire McCaskill (D-MO) said in scheduling hearings on the National Guard incident, “Frankly, a halfway sophisticated high school student could have seen the ability to commit fraud here.” Then why was the program so poorly designed and structured without adequate controls? The Incentive existed to commit fraud in these cases. Clearly, the factors at play here must go far beyond the standard explanation of “greed,”—but what were they? Absent the opportunity to interview the accused, all we can do is opine. Some thoughts:

Our military services are large groups with distinct cultures—collections of people with shared values, shared beliefs and understandings, and shared group identities.

Many service members find that when they join these “groups,” they must decide whether to go along with group behaviors with which they may potentially be in conflict. You conform to group-sanctioned behaviors or you quit. If you choose to resist, you may have to suffer the consequences of censure (a shame-inducing outcome) or worse, exclusion and ostracism. Leaving can be a challenge under a typical military service contract that requires dedication and commitment for a number of years. And then would come the need to find a job in the civilian world.

The temptation (the “pressure” in the fraud triangle) then is to participate in the behavior minimally until departure is more of an option. It is the “path of least resistance” and shows how “the road to hell is paved with good intentions.” Over time, the participation becomes easier (see rationalization comments below) and more rewarding. Now, the individual is “addicted,” having reached the point where there is no desire to leave. Law enforcement professionals refer to the process of adopting the path of least resistance as the “slippery slope.”

Implied in the slippery slope is the very human coping mechanism of Rationalization, the psychological mechanisms that grease the slope of egregious human behaviors. A “psychological” autopsy of the fraud including targeted interviewing of those who participated would be helpful in identifying the forces of rationalization in these cases, but here are some additional rationalizations based on psychologist Michael J. Apter’s new model of motivation “Reversal Theory” from our text:

  • “Everybody gets ahead here by getting a little ‘help’ with their exams; I wanna be part of the gang (benefit others and belong).”
  • “I am in service to my country and so I can take all the breaks I can get (serving others).”
  • “Our pay is too damn low; our command officers expect us to scratch in any way possible to improve it (mastery of a challenge).”
  • “Once I get qualified (or requalified), I am able to prove my ability. This is just a little roadblock that I need to get over (rebel against rules).”
  • “People around here are too damn uptight about the rules and restrictions; the real way to get ahead is to find ways around them and it’s a fun game (play).”

At this point, the question arises as to how the “Tone from the Top” plays into this behavioral pathology. Especially top-down communications regarding expectations (Incentive) and permissiveness (Rationalization). We can see where an “up or out” career path in the military provides vibrant incentive to cheat, enabling the “up” and avoiding the “out.” Countering this pressure is the military’s emphasis on conducting oneself with honor. The result? Value conflict for the service member, a conflict that is somewhat eased when highly esteemed leaders stray from model behaviors and allow the promotion of less meritorious officers (commissioned and noncommissioned), or wink at less-than-honorable behaviors—in effect condoning them. Perhaps they have become enamored of their power and the attention – like Petraus and his biography writing mistress, or they have created a dynamic of a charismatic leader and unquestioning followers.

What are the risks associated with these scandals? In the context of the military, there is a very real possibility that the proficiency exam cheating could put the public at risk (and at the very least, colleague service members too). The Navy scandals came out of the Navy’s Nuclear Propulsion Program; and the Air Force incidents involved nuclear missile officers! That is what we would call world class risk! The risks involved in the National Guard recruiting case are more heavily weighted to the financial: In all the National Guard paid more than $300 million for more than 130,000 enlistments. Over 100,000 people received bonuses. And according to the USA Today report, those being investigated range from enlisted soldiers to two general officers, including a major general. A less obvious but more damaging risk is the assumption now reinforced in the broader culture among those in the ranks that cheating and “beating the system” is “the way things get done.” We have come full circle in our speculations about the origins and evolution of a “cheating culture” in the U.S. armed forces. What do you think?

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